THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM

PAUL VINOGRADOFF F.B.A.

BROOKLYN
PUBLIC LIBRARY

Date 4-20-15



Acc. M 1157884

Class No. 947

Book No. V78

Form Bo. 12-14-100M. M. & C. Co.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/russianproblem0000paul

THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM

THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM

BY

PAUL VINOGRADOFF. F.B.A.

CORPUS PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MOSCOW

BROOKLYN PUBLIC LIBRARY

M 1157884

LONDON

CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD.

947
V78

First published December 1914

BROOKLYN
PUBLIC LIBRARY

Great events have been crowded into the space of a few weeks, and it is difficult to regain one's balance in the rush of unexpected experiences. Every one feels that there is a background to all these 'events' in the shape of 'conditions,' and that what is happening now is only a manifestation of latent forces gathered long before the collision.

One of the popular surprises of the war has been the gigantic strength of Russia, and the public spirit which animates her in this crisis. The fact that German statesmen and military leaders entirely miscalculated these forces, in spite or because of the close neighbourhood of both countries, is casting ridicule on the pedantic conceit of the chosen Kultur-people.

But if 'conditions' have been of great importance in the war, their study will repay

attention when the war is over and the immediate occasion for explaining surprising facts has passed. The operation of latent forces is sure to make itself felt again and again in the future.

The weight of such considerations seems to be realised at the present time by the British public. A remarkable characteristic of the literature which has sprung up in such exuberant growth in regard to the war, has been that it is primarily directed to account for latent forces and conditions.

Personally I have had numberless inquiries from friends and from strangers about the state of Russia, her prospects, her chances of peaceful and progressive development. English public opinion finds it naturally difficult to readjust its estimates: it is not very long since the hatchet has been buried between the two countries, and, besides, there are many traits about the present political situation in Russia which rightly shock people in the West. But thoughtful observers understand that it is not this or the other action of

the government that matters, but the general evolution of the nation.

It is felt more and more that a decisive transformation is taking place in the Eastern Empire, that the effects of this transformation are already apparent on all sides, and that its general result is a foregone conclusion, in the sense of progress from arbitrary methods towards the rule of law.

The two modest contributions to the elucidation of the great problem, which are offered in the present instance, are intended rather to raise questions than to solve them, rather to point out certain directions of thought than to treat of the subject in a consecutive manner. A larger book may come later on, but I thought that even a lecture and a letter on the great problem would not be superfluous by way of introduction to such a book. I have been led to this assumption partly by the very cordial reception which was given me when I delivered the lecture published now under the heading ' Russia after the War,' at Sheffield and at Nottingham, to large popular audiences.

The letter to the *Times* on the psychology of a nation has also been well received on its appearance, and, as the theme is closely connected with the subject of the lecture, I have taken leave to reproduce its text.

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE v

RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 1

RUSSIA. The Psychology of a Nation 29

RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR

The war, with all its calamities and bereavements, has certain redeeming features: it forces us to look beyond the surface, to verify estimates and to brush away prejudices, to seek for adequate explanations of striking events. It is from this educational point of view that I should like to approach my subject. I am not going to trespass on the domain of strategists and military historians. I do not intend to deal with the causes of the war, the justification of Russian efforts, the curious history of diplomatic moves which led up to the collision. All these things have been brilliantly discussed by competent authorities. I wish to consider the aims and methods of Russia. The subject is a momentous problem for the nations of Europe, and much will depend on its right solution. But the problem is even more pressing and momentous for the Russians themselves.

A great help in such an inquiry is afforded

by a review of the historical surroundings. History is not a science enabling us to predict coming events with exactness, but it does make a signal difference whether we consider facts of social life as detached experiences or as links in a chain of development. In the first instance we shall hardly have anything to guide us but the impressions and appetites of the moment. In the second, we are able to obtain a wide perspective and a basis for rational plans. Turning to the case in point, it is one thing to state observations as to the politics and culture of present-day Russia, and another to judge of Russian political and cultural evolution in the light of the history of Europe, and especially of Eastern Europe. When we look at absolutism, bureaucracy, or the domineering habits of military aristocracy in Russia from this second point of view, we perceive at once that what we have to deal with is not the peculiar product of Byzantine servilism or Muscovite brutality, but one of the features of Eastern European development, the expression of forces which have been at work and are still at work in Prussia and Austria as well.

If historical laws are to be formulated at all, one of the most certain and conspicuous among

them may be summed up in the observation that social progress starts from countries with a well-differentiated sea-board, and gradually spreads to the more massive continental blocks. Eventually these blocks of *hinterland* may prove more fertile and rich in culture than the tracts which have assumed the initiative; but it is in river deltas, in peninsulas, and in islands that the movement of civilisation originates. Greece and Italy, France and England, were leaders in Europe when the banks of the Elbe, of the Danube, of the Vistula, and of the Volga were wildernesses. Even in modern times the French borrowed largely from the Italians, the English from the French, the Germans both from English and French, and the Russians from the Germans. No wonder Peter the Great named his new capital Petersburg—as Frederick the Great, while defeating the French in the field, acknowledged their supremacy in literature and science, and wrote French with greater ease than German. The two most famous pronouncements of Prussian state-craft in the eighteenth century are tinged by French thought. Monarchy was to be the *rocher de bronze*—the bronze rock of the Prussian system. Every one was to seek

salvation '*nach seiner façon*'—in his own fashion. In the same way, Russia has been taking lessons from German administrators and thinkers.

Faced with problems of colonisation and self-defence, unprotected by the silver streak of the sea, unwilling to subordinate considerations of safety to the claims of individual liberty, the three eastern states have sacrificed many elements of prosperity and progress to discipline and efficiency in war. Even now the Austrian Emperor may assume dictatorial power on the strength of the fourteenth clause of a constitutional law. His personal authority remains the chief link of union in his heterogeneous empire, and Emperor Francis Joseph has repeatedly exerted his supreme power for adjusting difficulties. Quite recently representative government has been suspended by 'Acts of State' in Bohemia and Croatia. As for Germany, the franchise in Prussia is perverted by a narrow property classification, while Mecklenburg enjoys the unenviable distinction of being the only country in Europe which still clings to a system of estates. Even the stunted constitutionalism of modern Prussia and modern Austria is of quite recent

growth. The principle that the 'scanty intelligence of subjects' should not be allowed to meddle with statecraft is of German origin. It gave way in Prussia during the Revolution of 1848, but was triumphantly reasserted in the reaction of the 'fifties and in the conflict between the Prussian government and national representation in the 'sixties. Germany is indebted for its constitutional regeneration to the victorious struggle of 1870. In Austria, liberal institutions have sprung from defeats: the humiliation of military absolutism in 1859 gave the first blow to political absolutism, and the collapse in 1866 resulted in the setting up of the present Dual Monarchy in its constitutional shape.

It is not difficult to perceive the analogy between these retreats of absolutism in Prussia and in Austria and the evolution of Russia. The protector of Austria and Prussia, Emperor Nicholas I., seemed to embody the conception of Hobbes's Leviathan, and he experienced in his fate the hollowness of a political dream requiring that every live man in the country should be paralysed in order that Leviathan should think and act like one man. The Crimean War showed what a poor thing a

machine State is even when composed of personally brave men. The object-lesson went home in the case of the government as well as in that of the people, and the forces of political insight, patriotic devotion, intellectual concentration, which had been stealthily but steadily gathering beneath the iron frame of the Nicholas régime, asserted themselves in an unexpected manner; the glorious generation of the 'sixties achieved work unsurpassed in any land for breadth of view and far-reaching results: the emancipation of the serfs, the creation of local self-government, the regeneration of the courts, the beginnings of an independent press, the national reform of military service, the reconstitution of the universities as self-governing bodies—all these and many minor reforms were carried out at that time.

Unfortunately, changes of that magnitude resemble natural processes in which the ultimate settlement is preceded by conflicts between elemental forces. It is sufficiently known how the reform movement was arrested by the fatal split between the progressive parties which strove for parliamentary government, and the Conservatives who rallied around the principle of autocracy. Terroristic attempts,

culminating in the murder of Alexander the Second, brought about the long reaction under Alexander the Third, and the policy of contradictions after his death. The country had, as it were, to pass another examination in the Japanese War, and the defects of the autocratic system were again revealed in a conspicuous manner by the inefficiency of the army and the lack of public spirit in the people. Then came a time resembling the Revolution of 1848 in Central Europe. Important positions were permanently gained: the beginnings of national representation, the declaration of civic rights, an increased freedom of the press. But on the exuberance of idealism followed a bitter awakening to the significance of very real obstacles: the indifference of the great mass of the people, the danger to social order from lawless outcasts, the inexperience and doctrinaire delusions of popular leaders. The analogy between Russia in 1906 and Germany in 1848 is striking even as regards details: when one reads the speeches in the first Duma, one cannot help recalling to mind the debates of the Frankfort parliament.

And now, after some eight years of gloomy

reaction, we stand again at the parting of the ways. The war of the nations, in which thousands of the best men of Russia are being sacrificed, has united all in the fundamental duty of self-defence; but, more than this, it drives people not only to postpone their strife, but to reconsider their positions, to reflect on the problem of reconstruction which looms in the background and will have to be tackled in earnest when the days of marches and battles have passed. Great words have been pronounced from the height of the throne in an appeal to united Russia, and this appeal has been responded to fully and warmly by all parties and nationalities. It is a united and not a divided Russia that ought to solve the problem of reconstruction. An effort must be made to approach it in the light of past experience as well as of future aims, without doctrinairism and without selfishness, in the same noble spirit of patriotic duty which has given such wonderful strength to the Russian armies in the field. What we want in Russia is not gambling in revolution with its fantastic prospects and terrible realities. We want thorough organic reforms, something like the movement of the 'sixties on a larger scale.

The situation would be a providential one for a statesman of the calibre of Bismarck. The great German Chancellor, though a Prussian *junker* by birth, and a Conservative by allegiance, had the strength of mind to frame the democratic constitution of the German Empire. The imperial government in Russia should be able to perceive that the uncontested leadership of the nation through this war imposes the moral obligation of generous and far-sighted political action. The popularity acquired by victories should not be squandered in petty gains or in the lethargy of fatigue. Opportunities like the present do not recur twice. It would be too awful to think that this one should be lost, and that the dark waves of discontent and despair should again resume their ceaseless, battering onslaught against the foundations of Russian historical institutions.

In any case, the course of Russian political evolution follows on parallel lines with that of Russia's western neighbours: from personal rule towards constitutionalism. The attempt to trace a contrast between Russia and the two neighbouring states is altogether misleading.

Let us now turn to a consideration of the

assets on which a reforming statesmanship can reckon: indirectly such an examination will suggest some of the aims of progressive evolution.

The first and greatest asset of Russia is its peasant democracy. The population of the empire amounts at present to some 170,000,000, and of these some 80 per cent., that is about 140,000,000, are peasants, small cultivating landowners, in parts rising to the status of what used to be called in old England, yeomanry. This is the condition of the Cossacks, for example. These figures are worth careful consideration. In one of his vivid letters to the *Times*, Stephen Graham speaks of the endless flow of Russian troops through Moscow in the period of mobilisation —'a magnificent peasantry' he calls them; and Sir Ian Hamilton, when writing from the Japanese headquarters in the war of 1904, could not help being struck, even in that unfortunate campaign, by the qualities of the Russian private soldier, which he rightly ascribed to peasant origin and bringing up. Now the 'magnificent peasantry' is a force not only in the military sense. Efforts are being made by all political parties in England

to revive small land holdings which have been swept away by the course of economic evolution. It is a great question whether this can be done nowadays, but we all feel that industrial development, however fruitful in some respects, however necessary from an economic point of view, is fraught with danger from the social point of view: it severs the living connection of the people with the soil, and subjects man too much to the garish trend of town life.

Russia is fortunate enough to possess 140,000,000 of frugal, hard-working tillers of the soil. Even in the hard age of serfdom the peasantry succeeded in preserving personal dignity and an unwavering allegiance to its religious and political creeds. The village community was a strong shield in those days: in spite of numberless acts of cruelty and arbitrary extortion on the part of the lords, it helped to keep up cohesion between the members of the peasant class and a standard of rural custom. The village, the *mir*, could be described as the necessary defensive organisation of the people.

But it proved to be a fetter for *offensive* purposes, that is, for enterprise and progress, and it is slowly giving way before an individual-

istic movement starting from the emancipation of 1861, and fostered by recent statutory measures. In spite of many shortcomings of legislation and policy in this respect, one thing seems clear: this growth of private ownership has given an immense impetus to energy and thrift. And what is still more remarkable, the habit of acting together, of making compromises and arranging for joint effort, a habit acquired in connection with *mir* management, has not disappeared now that the village community is making way for contractual relations. Co-operative associations arise everywhere in instinctive and exuberant growth. Recently British estates and agricultural exhibitions were visited by unexpected guests—by farmers from Siberia—members of a widespread and powerful co-operative union. The same may be said of workmen and agricultural labourers —they naturally form closely fitted co-operative groups—the so-called *artels*. This enormous peasant mass is well able to take care of itself, and the object of reforming legislation in regard to it should be to remove police interference and to give free play to its life. One institution, born of the aristocratic reaction of Alexander the Third's time—the tutelage of

the land-captains—the squires wielding police power and administering justice, ought to disappear as soon as possible, and a beginning has been made in this direction by the third Duma.

On the other hand, there is a lamentable gap to be filled up as regards provision for the poor. The mobilisation of landed property is bound to occasion an immense amount of distress in spite of certain beneficial effects. Weak and improvident members of the villages are losing the support of communal organisations, and their hold on the land; the rural proletariat is increasing fast, and yet the problem of public assistance has not been properly tackled. Russian legislators should take to heart the example of England, where the initial move in the history of the Poor Laws, the Statute of 1603, followed closely on the disintegration of the ancient customary community of copyholders. The old system of throwing the care of the destitute mainly on the villages was not a success, even in former days. Mendicancy was always one of the open sores of Russia, partly, no doubt, on account of the national leaning towards personal charity, fostered by religious impulses. These economically mis-

directed efforts are altogether insufficient to cope with the evil now, and a comprehensive poor law is certainly one of the needs of the situation. The development of credit to help agriculture and industry, as well as systematic measures in aid of emigration, are, of course, also indicated, and important beginnings have already been made in these directions.

Besides all these economical and technical improvements, there is one requirement which towers above all the rest—the requirement of popular education. If the Russian peasants were to remain illiterate they might not count for more in the balance of cultural power than the ryots of the Dekkan or the fellahin of Egypt. The truth of this is now fully recognised in Russia, and constant and rapid progress may be registered in this respect. The provision of elementary schools has become, since the 'sixties, the principal plank in the administrative programme of local self-governing bodies, of municipalities and county councils.

Incitements in this direction have been provided by every period of trial and distress. The famine and cholera years 1891-1893, for example, gave a strong impulse towards energetic action, because it was recognised on all

hands that the best means of guarding against disease and counteracting bad seasons lay in provident husbandry and a certain standard of instruction. Even the reaction after the revolutionary outbreak of 1905 and 1906 did not contest this point, and the bureaucratic ministries of Stolypin, Kokovtzoff, and Goremykin have had to come into line with public feeling on the subject. The honour of driving back the flood of illiteracy belongs, however, primarily to the self-governing institutions of the provinces and towns. In order to give an idea of the material efforts connected with the movement, let me state that in 1877 there were about 10,000 provincial schools, and in 1911, 28,000; and that the *zemstvos* (provincial councils) spent 9,000,000 roubles (somewhat less than £1,000,000) on their schools in 1895, and 73,000,000 (more than £7,000,000) in 1912, the latter sum corresponding to nearly 30 per cent. of their entire budget. The time is approaching when all the children in Russia will receive at least three years' elementary schooling.

In more progressive centres, like the capitals, universal education has already been reached. I may instance, briefly, the way in which we

carried out the task in Moscow fourteen years ago, when I was myself engaged on the work of the educational committee of that city. We worked out an expanding scheme for the provision of classes to meet the requirements of all children reaching the school age, whom their parents would care to send to the schools. We could not make attendance compulsory by law, but, as a matter of fact, all the families of the city, the population of which at that time numbered about 1,000,000, with a negligible number of exceptions, did send their boys and girls to the town schools. Thus schooling was universal without being compulsory. The course embraced three years, but it is being gradually extended to four; and secondary schools of all kinds are growing fast.

For the nation as a whole, a definite scheme has been worked out and has obtained the support of the Duma, by which a network of schools sufficient to compass the entire population of school age of the agricultural provinces of the Empire, will be organised and started in the course of some eight to ten years. This will be done, of course, with the help of liberal appropriations from the treasury, but it cannot be too often repeated that the pioneers

of elementary education in Russia have been the local self-governing bodies.

The second general inference from our survey should be that the future of Russia depends on the essentially peaceful process of democratic enlightenment and economic improvement. There is yet another fundamental asset in the life of modern Russia. In the ebb and flow of political strife, people are sometimes apt to overlook the great continuous lines which mark the trend of development and ensure progress. We have seen what a broad democratic basis is provided by the peasant population of the Empire and how all branches of activity have to be connected in one way or another with the mighty trunk of the country—the Russian peasantry. The middle classes have also something to show in their history which is very different from the supposed servility of Russian political customs.

In 1864 the state was obliged to recognise that the affairs of the nation could not be directed satisfactorily by orders from the centre, that something more was needed than busy chancelleries and provincial governors with discretionary powers. The *zemstvos*—county and district councils—were created by law to take care of local affairs—of roads, of sanitary

work, of schools, of hospitals and almshouses, of veterinary inspection, of rural credit and agronomic improvements. This vast domain was not surrendered without misgivings and restrictions—a jealous supervision by police officials, governors, and the home ministry was extended over the whole area of the self-governing *zemstvos* and towns.

Another antidote against too liberal a policy of the newly created bodies was provided by their composition. The Statute of 1864, and even more that of 1890, passed under the reactionary influences of Alexander the Third's reign, gave a privileged position in the *zemstvos* to the landed gentry or *noblesse*. This was achieved by a complicated system of electoral colleges and a restricted franchise. It would be impossible to examine these measures in detail. They found their historical explanation in the fact that the gentry had for centuries supplied the official and military class which helped to organise and to rule the vast empire. At this stage, however, class legislation of this kind proved to be mischievous and was doomed to failure; the gentry is fast losing ground in consequence of the emancipation of the rural serfs; estate after estate is

passing into the hands of business men and of the rising peasantry.

The privileged position in *zemstvo* self-government naturally led to abuses of influence and to corruption, but in spite of all such checks, the institution struck firm roots and prospered. The history of the advance towards better sanitation, more numerous and better schools, technical improvements of all kinds, is the history of one wearisome and protracted struggle between the growing forces of public opinion and the stubborn resistance of the old régime. The rearguard fights of the latter often assumed the character of desperate counter-attacks, but the flow of self-government continued to press on with elemental force. With all its drawbacks and imperfections the *zemstvo* movement has been one of the most astonishing illustrations of the action of leading ideas on masses—and also of the aptitude of the Russians for social work. Sometimes, in the days of great national calamities, during years of famine or of epidemics, in the course of a great war, with its immense numbers of wounded and sick to be tended, the stream overflowed its banks, as it were, and emergency organisations enlisted

the services of countless untiring and fearless workers from all classes of society.

Such movements are disliked by hierarchical bureaucracy, but they cannot be prevented or ignored, and the future lies in the recognition of a constant participation of the people at large, in all its classes, in public work. One of the first measures necessary in that direction is the creation of what is called in Russia the small *zemstvo* unit, of a civil parish uniting members of all classes in the self-governing locality. Under the present system the peasants, though emancipated, form rural units of their own, while all other inhabitants—small landowners, merchants, artisans, clerks, members of the liberal professions—are only organised in the province and district or not organised at all for self-government. When this anomaly is remedied, a firm basis will be gained for widening the *zemstvo* franchise with its attendant responsibilities and rights. In the towns the defects of class privilege are less felt, but an extension of the franchise is also urgently needed.

One of the effects of such an extension may prove to be unexpected: I think it will strengthen rational conservatism. The un-

organised third estate of Russia, the vague class called the 'intelligents,' and led by the liberal professions—lawyers, doctors, statisticians, engineers, and teachers—is at present often revolutionary and apt to indulge in unpractical speculations, because it has no stake in the everyday management of public affairs. Its members have often a thorough experience in certain branches of public work, for example, in medical attendance on the poor; but they are made to act as subordinate officials under orders from the squires and rich traders who control the counties and the municipalities. Such a position naturally produces bitterness and sweeping criticism. The greater the stake of every citizen in public affairs, the more readily he will recognise limitations and cope with difficulties in a practical manner. One thing is certain, the channels for sound self-government exist in Russia, and it is only necessary to widen them and to build out their network.

What is to be said about the central government itself? This is the part of the edifice which is most noticeable to the view of foreigners and which has certainly an immense importance in shaping the general course of

political life. In this matter, more than in anything else, it is impossible to express more than a personal opinion, conditioned by a party point of view, but even such personal opinions may be worth consideration. It seems clear, to begin with, that it would be a fatal mistake to indulge in anti-monarchical, anti-dynastic agitation. Men from the extreme left may be to some extent bound by revolutionary antecedents, the majority even on the radical side will, it is to be hoped, perceive that, after a glorious war in which the nation has rallied with the sure instinct of self-preservation round its historical leader, it would not be proper to challenge the authority of this leader. Even apart from the peculiar circumstances of the moment, Russia needs a strong central power, endowed with uncontested sovereignty, armed with the full force of popular delegation. But just because the Tsar undoubtedly wields such a power, its holder need not resort to any petty expedients, or indulge in party strife, or aspire to meddle in all the details of legislation and administration. The competence of the Emperor of Russia cannot be circumscribed by the limitations of classical parliamentary government.

The maxim ' le roi règne, mais ne gouverne pas ' could not be applied to him in common sense. But no more would the maxim ' l'Etat c'est moi ' be applicable in this case.

A sovereign exercising the supreme regulating power in the Empire can well afford to take care that popular representation in his State should not be a farce and that his ministers should not act as the viziers of an Oriental despot. Cabinet government and the rule of parliamentary majorities may still be far ahead in Russian political evolution, but a reform of the Duma, which would do away with the Austrian-born jugglery of electoral colleges and a prohibitive franchise, is a first step which ought not to be delayed much longer. It is not necessary to introduce universal suffrage according to the famous four-tailed formula—universal, equal, secret, and direct. Let there by all means be a householder's franchise or election in two stages, but the electoral system ought to be simple and conduce to a manifestation of genuine public opinion.

A necessary complement to the reform of the Duma must be that of the Russian House of Lords—the Council of the Empire. In its present condition it is a clog on all progressive

legislation. Even bills passed by the artificially manipulated Duma of our days have stuck in the Council of the Empire. A notable example was the measure granting self-government to the Polish provinces. It was surrounded in the Duma with all sorts of guarantees against possible misuse by the Poles, but it contained one important and vital concession—it allowed the Poles to use their own language in the debates of county and town councils. The Council of the Empire struck out this clause. Characteristically enough the bill was re-introduced by the government with the objectionable clause—by express command of the Emperor. If a Second Chamber is to exist and to play a useful part in Russian political life, it must be entirely reconstructed. Instead of a majority composed of superannuated bureaucrats, with a sprinkling of elective elements, it ought to be based on the representation of public bodies and interests—the county councils, the leading professional and economic organisations.

Again, even if it should be out of the question to speak of ministries formed from the leading political parties, if the ministers remain officials selected and directed by the Tsar, they should

be chosen in such a way as not to defy clearly expressed public opinion. Surely it is not wise to place and keep in office men who have been repeatedly denounced by assemblies constituted to please the government. The baneful discord of views and policy which nowadays is almost a standing feature of Russian politics ought to cease : it is not a symptom of health.

A more difficult problem arises in regard to the large bureaucratic establishments of the civil service. The traditions of bureaucracy are certainly not promising, and yet one can neither get rid of the complex mechanism of central control nor alter its spirit and habits at one stroke. The problem of gradual sanitation is not insoluble, however, if the new watchwords of legality and respect for individual freedom be firmly given out and enforced. There is in the modern history of Russia a remarkable instance of a very rapid improvement in a kindred domain, namely, in the administration of justice. The courts were notoriously corrupt and pettifogging in the old days, and yet the great statutes of 1864 were wonderfully efficient in introducing new principles and new methods. A similar new orientation must be effected as regards the civil services ;

and it is to be hoped that the universities will not fail in infusing new blood into the administrative personnel, as they have done in the case of the judicature.

One idea has to be kept well in view all the time. It is not so much technical changes that are important, although these will have to be taken in hand; the most important point is the substitution of the rule of law and freedom for the reign of arbitrary discretion. A firm Habeas Corpus Act, a real application of the various liberties, which for Europeans are as necessary as breathing air,—freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of meetings, equality before the law—these are the things needed above all in Russia. These liberties are recognised in principle and stunted in application. On the 17th of October 1914 a solemn pledge was taken to give these principles full play and adequate guarantees, but the country is still waiting for the fulfilment of this pledge. That is where the Jewish question comes in, of course. Racial antipathy and the fact that the Jewish character has specific defects as well as specific qualities do not warrant a treatment of our Jewish countrymen as equals in

burdens and as outcasts in rights. This anomaly has existed more or less everywhere in Europe, and everywhere it has given way—so it will be in Russia, and the longer the day of emancipation is delayed, the more difficult it will be to effect the ultimate settlement.

I do not want, however, to discuss problems of detail at any length : my object was to set forth what appear to me to be the conditions of the one and main problem—the conditions of Russia's coming of age in public life. Nor do I want to prophesy in regard to the steps and circumstances by which the transformation will be effected : details will depend on many accidents which no one can foresee ; nor is it likely that the walls of Jericho will fall at one blast of the trumpets. But apart from details, I firmly believe that the transformation is approaching, and I hope it may be effected somewhat on the lines I have sketched. I am sure of one thing—the people of Russia, and more especially the educated class, the 'intelligents,' will revive in the atmosphere of the great reform movement and may yet astonish the world in peace as in war. The educated Russian, of whom I can speak with some knowledge, may have many faults—

he may be too impulsive, lacking in discipline, inexperienced in politics; but he has one quality which will save him and will save his country. He is longing to serve a great idea and to merge his insignificant self in a common cause. He is by nature a crusader. Let us wish success to his crusade.

RUSSIA[1]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION

In this time of crisis, when the clash of ideas seems as fierce as the struggle of the hosts, it is the duty of those who possess authentic information on one or the other point in dispute to speak out firmly and clearly. I should like to contribute some observations on German and Russian conceptions in matters of culture. I base my claim to be heard on the fact that I have had the privilege of being closely connected with Russian, German, and English life. As a Russian Liberal, who had to give up an honourable position at home for the sake of his opinions, I can hardly be suspected of subserviency to the Russian bureaucracy.

I am struck by the insistence with which the Germans represent their cause in this world-wide struggle as the cause of civilisation as opposed to Muscovite barbarism; and I am

[1] Reprinted, by permission, from the *Times* of September 14, 1914.

not sure that some of my English friends do not feel reluctant to side with the subjects of the Tsar against the countrymen of Harnack and Eucken. One would like to know, however, since when have the Germans taken up this attitude? They were not so squeamish during the 'war of emancipation' which gave birth to modern Germany. At that time the people of Eastern Prussia were anxiously waiting for the appearance of Cossacks, as heralds of the Russian hosts who were to emancipate them from the yoke of Napoleon. Did the Prussians and Austrians reflect on the humiliation of an alliance with the Muscovites, and on the superiority of the Code Civil, when the Russian Guard at Kulm [1] stood like a rock against the desperate onslaught of Vandamme? Perhaps by this time the inhabitants of Berlin

[1] *Kulm.* After the defeat of the Allies by Napoleon at Dresden in 1813, the French corps of Vandamme appeared in their rear. If it had succeeded in cutting the line of communications with Prague, the retreat of the Allies might have been turned into a rout. The First Division of the Russian Guard was ordered to stop Vandamme, and this it did at Kulm on August 29, although it was outnumbered by three to one and lost almost half its men in killed and wounded. On the next day, Prussian and Austrian troops came up, and Vandamme surrendered with the remainder of his corps. The battle was the turning-point in the campaign of 1813. The King of Prussia granted the Iron Cross to all those who took part in this desperate struggle; hence the Iron Cross was called the 'Kulm Cross' by the Russians.

have obliterated the bas-relief in the 'Alley of Victories' which represents Prince William of Prussia, the future victor of Sedan, seeking safety within the square of the Kaluga regiment![1] Russian blood has flowed in numberless battles in the cause of the Germans and Austrians. The present Armageddon might perhaps have been avoided if the Tsar Nicholas I. had left the Hapsburg monarchy to its own resources in 1849, and had not unwisely crushed the independence of Hungary. Within our own memory, the benevolent neutrality of Russia guarded Germany in 1870 from an attack in the rear by its opponents of Sadowa. Are all such facts to be explained away on the ground that the despised Muscovites may be occasionally useful as 'gun-meat,' but are guilty of sacrilege if they take up a stand against German taskmasters in 'shining armour'? The older generations of Germany had not yet reached that comfortable conclusion. The last recommendation which the founder of the German Empire made on his

[1] *Prince William of Prussia and the Kaluga regiment.* The future conqueror of Sedan first fought as a boy of seventeen at Bar-sur-Aube (February 27, 1814). In that battle he joined the Russian Fifth Infantry (Kaluga), a regiment of which he afterwards became an honorary colonel.

death-bed to his grandson was to keep on good terms with that Russia which is now proclaimed to be a debased mixture of Byzantine, Tartar, and Muscovite abominations.

Fortunately, the course of history does not depend on the frantic exaggerations of partisans. The world is not a class-room in which docile nations are distributed according to the arbitrary standards of German pedagogues. Europe has admired the patriotic resistance of the Spanish, Tyrolese, and Russian peasants to the enlightened tyranny of Napoleon. There are other standards of culture besides proficiency in research and aptitude for systematic work. The massacre of Louvain, the hideous brutality of the Germans towards non-combatants—to mention only one or two of the appalling occurrences of these last weeks—have thrown a lurid light on the real character of twentieth-century German culture. 'By their fruits ye shall know them,' said our Lord; and the saying which He aimed at the Scribes and Pharisees of His time is indeed applicable to the proud votaries of German civilisation to-day. Nobody wishes to underestimate the services rendered by the German people to the cause of European progress; but those who

have known Germany during the years following the achievements of 1870, have watched with dismay the growth of that arrogant conceit which the Greeks called ὕβρις. The cold-blooded barbarity advocated by Bernhardi, the cynical view taken of international treaties and of the obligations of honour by the German Chancellor—these things reveal a spirit which it would be difficult indeed to describe as a sign of progress.

One of the effects of such a frame of mind is to strike the victim of it with blindness. This symptom has been manifest in the stupendous blunders of German diplomacy. The successors of Bismarck have alienated their natural allies, such as Italy and Roumania, and have driven England into this war against the evident intentions of English Radicals. But the Germans have misconceived even more important things. They set out on their adventure in the belief that England would be embarrassed by civil war and unable to take any effective part in the fray; and they had to learn something which all their writers had not taught them—that there is a nation's spirit watching over England's safety and greatness, a spirit at whose mighty call all

party differences and racial strifes fade into insignificance. In the same way, they had reckoned on the unpreparedness of Russia, in consequence of internal dissensions and administrative weakness, without taking heed of the love of all Russians for Russia, of their devotion to the long-suffering giant whose life is throbbing in their veins. The Germans expected to encounter raw and sluggish troops, under intriguing time-servers and military Hamlets, whose 'native hue of resolution' had been 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' Instead of that, they were confronted with soldiers of the same type as those whom Frederick the Great and Napoleon admired, led at last by chiefs worthy of their men. And behind these soldiers they discovered a nation. Do they realise now what a force they have awakened? Do they understand that a steadfast, indomitable resolution, despising all theatrical display, is moving Russia's hosts? Even if the Russian generals had proved mediocre, even if many disappointing days had been in store, the nation would not have belied its history. It has seen more than one conquering army go down before it. The Tartars and the Poles, the Swedes of Charles XII., the

Prussians of Frederick the Great, the Grand Army of Napoleon, were not less formidable than the Kaiser's array, but the task of mastering a united Russia proved too much for each one of them. The Germans counted on the fratricidal feud between Poles and Russians, on the resentment of the Jews, on Mohammedan sympathies with Turkey, and so forth. They had to learn too late that the Jews had rallied round the country of their hearths, and that the best of them cannot believe that Russia will continue to deny them the measure of justice and humanity which the leaders of Russian thought have long acknowledged to be due to them. More important still, the Germans have read the Grand Duke's appeal to the Poles, and must have heard of the manner in which it was received in Poland, of the enthusiastic support offered to the Russian cause. If nothing else came of this great historical upheaval but the reconciliation of the Russians and their noble kinsmen the Poles, the sacrifices which this crisis demands would not be too great a price to pay for the result.

But the hour of trial has revealed other things. It has appealed to the best feelings

and the best elements of the Russian nation. It has brought out in a striking manner the fundamental tendency of Russian political life and the essence of Russian culture, which so many people have been unable to perceive on account of the chaff on the surface. Russia has been going through a painful crisis. In the words of the Manifesto of October 17-30, 1905, the outward casing of her administration had become too narrow and oppressive for the development of society with its growing needs, its altered perceptions of rights and duties, its changed relations between government and people. The result was that deep-seated political *malaise* which made itself felt during the Japanese War, when Russian society at large refused to take any interest in the fate of the army; the feverish rush for 'liberties' after the defeat; the subsequent reign of reaction and repression, which has cast such a gloom over Russian life during these last years. But the effort of the national struggle has dwarfed all these misunderstandings and misfortunes, as in Great Britain the call of the common Motherland has dwarfed the dispute between Unionists and Home Rulers. Russian parties have not renounced their aspirations;

Russian Liberals in particular believe in self-government and the rule of law as firmly as ever. But they have realised as one man that this war is not an adventure engineered by unscrupulous ambition, but a decisive struggle for independence and existence; and they are glad to be arrayed in close ranks with their opponents from the Conservative side. A friend, a Liberal like myself, writes to me from Moscow: 'It is a great, unforgettable time; we are happy to be all at one!' And from the ranks of the most unfortunate of Russia's children, from the haunts of the political exiles in Paris, comes the news that Bourtzeff, one of the most prominent among the revolutionary leaders, has addressed an appeal to his comrades urging them to stand by their country to the utmost of their power.[1]

I may add that whatever may have been the shortcomings and the blunders of the Russian government, it is a blessing in this decisive crisis that Russians should have a firmly-knit organisation and a traditional centre of authority in the power of the Tsar. The present Emperor stands as the national leader,

[1] *Bourtzeff, a prominent Russian revolutionary leader.* I am glad to note that Bourtzeff fully endorses my view in a letter to the *Times* (issue of September 18, 1914).

not in the histrionic attitude of a War Lord, but in the quiet dignity of his office. He has said and done the right thing, and his subjects will follow him to a man. We are sure he will remember in the hour of victory the unstinted devotion and sacrifices of all the nationalities and parties of his vast Empire. It is our firm conviction that the sad tale of reaction and oppression is at an end in Russia, and that our country will issue from this momentous crisis with the insight and strength required for the constructive and progressive statesmanship of which it stands in need.

Apart from the details of political and social reform, is the regeneration of Russia a boon or a peril to European civilisation? The declamations of the Germans have been as misleading in this respect as in all others. The master-works of Russian literature are accessible in translation nowadays, and the cheap taunts of men like Bernhardi recoil on their own heads. A nation represented by Pushkin, Turgeneff, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky in literature, by Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin, Glinka, Moussorgsky, Tchaikovsky in art,[1] by Mende-

[1] *Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin,* etc. Only a few names are selected, almost at random. Of course, no description of pictures and no characterisation of painters can convey any adequate im-

leeff, Metchnikoff, Pavloff in science, by Kluchevsky and Solovieff in history, need not be ashamed to enter the lists in an international competition for the prizes of culture. But the German historians ought to have taught their pupils that in the world of ideas it is not such competitions that are important. A nation handicapped by its geography may have to start later in the field, and yet her performance may be relatively better than that of her more favoured neighbours. It is astonishing to read German diatribes about Russian backwardness when one remembers that as recently as fifty years ago Austria and Prussia were living under a régime which can hardly be considered more enlightened than the present rule in Russia. The Italians in Lombardy and Venice have still a vivid recollection of Austrian gaols; and as for Prussian militarism, one need not go further than the exploits of the Zabern garrison to illustrate its meaning. This being so, it is not particularly to be wondered at that the Eastern neighbour of Austria and Prussia has followed to some extent on the same lines.

But the general direction of Russia's evolu-

pression. Those who wish to form an opinion of Russian painting should go to Moscow and pay a visit to the Tretiakoff Gallery.

tion is not doubtful. Western students of her history might do well, instead of sedulously collecting damaging evidence, to pay some attention to the building-up of Russia's universities, the persistent efforts of the *zemstvos*, the independence and the zeal of the Press. German scholars should read Herzen's vivid description of the 'idealists of the 'forties.'[1] And what about the history of the emancipation of the serfs, or of the regeneration of the judicature? The 'reforms of the 'sixties'[2] are a household word in Russia, and surely they are one of the noblest efforts ever made by a nation in the direction of moral improvement.

[1] *The idealists of the 'forties.* They have been described by Herzen in his *Byloe i Dumy* (*Past and Thoughts*) in connection with intellectual life in Moscow. Both Westerners like Granovsky, Stankevitch, Ketscher, Herzen himself, and Slavophiles like J. Kireievsky and Chomiakoff, are vividly characterised in this brilliant autobiography.

[2] *The reforms of the 'sixties.* They comprise the great reforms carried out with rare patriotism and insight during the early years of Alexander II.'s reign. The principal were—the emancipation of the peasants (1861), the reorganisation of the judicial system (1864), and the creation of *zemstvo* self-government (1864). There was a number of other reforms besides—the University Statutes of 1863, the Press Law of 1865, the partial abolition of corporal punishment in 1863; and so forth. Many of these reforms have been adulterated by subsequent modifications; but the main current of progress could not be turned back, and there are no greater names in the history of Europe than those of N. Milutine, D. Milutine, Prince Cherkassky, J. Samarine, Unkovsky, Zarudny, and their companions.

Looking somewhat deeper, what right have the Germans to speak of their ideals of culture as superior to those of the Russian people? They deride the superstitions of the *mujikh* as if tapers and genuflexions were the principal matters of popular religion. Those who have studied the Russian people without prejudice know better than that. Read Selma Lagerloef's touching description of Russian pilgrims in Palestine.[1] She, the Protestant, has understood the true significance of the religious impulse which leads these poor men to the Holy Land, and which draws them to the numberless churches of the vast country. These simple people cling to the belief that there is something else in God's world besides toil and greed; they flock towards the light, and find in it the justification of their human craving for peace and mercy. For the Russian people have the Christian virtue of patience in suffering: their pity for the poor and oppressed is more than an occasional manifestation of individual feeling—it is deeply rooted in national psychology. This frame of mind has been scorned as fit for slaves! It is

[1] *Selma Lagerloef on Russian pilgrims.*—'Jerusalem,' vol. ii., 'On the Wings of the Dawn.'

indeed a case where the learning of philosophers is put to shame by the insight of the simple-minded. Conquerors should remember that the greatest victories in history have been won by the unarmed—by the Christian confessors whom the emperors sent to the lions, by the 'old believers' of Russia who went to Siberia and to the flames for their unyielding faith, by the Russian serfs who preserved their human dignity and social cohesion in spite of the exactions of their masters, by the Italians, Poles, and Jews, when they were trampled under foot by their rulers. It is such a victory of the spirit that Tolstoy had in mind when he preached his gospel of non-resistance; and I do not think even a German on the war-path would be blind enough to suppose that Tolstoy's message came from a craven soul. The orientation of the so-called 'intelligent' class in Russia—that is, the educated middle class, which is much more numerous and influential than people suppose—is somewhat different, of course. It is 'Western' in this sense, that it is imbued with current European ideas as to politics, economics, and law. It has to a certain extent lost the simple faith and religious fervour of the peasants. But it has

faithfully preserved the keynote of popular ideals. It is still characteristically humanitarian in its view of the world and in its aims. A book like that of General von Bernhardi would be impossible in Russia. If anybody were to publish it, it would not only fall flat, but earn for its author the reputation of a bloodhound. Many deeds of cruelty and brutality happen, of course, in Russia, but no writer of any standing would dream of building up a theory of violence in vindication of a claim to culture. It may be said, in fact, that the leaders of Russian public opinion are pacific, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian to a fault. The mystic philosopher, Vladimir Solovieff,[1] used to dream of the union of the churches with the Pope as the spiritual head, and democracy in the Russian sense as the broad basis of the rejuvenated Christendom. Dostoyevsky, a writer most sensitive to the claims of nationality in Russia, defined the ideal of the Russians in a celebrated speech as the em bodiment of a universally humanitarian type.

[1] *Vladimir Solovieff.* A talented philosopher, the son of the famous historian S. Solovieff. He was professor at Moscow for a short time.

[2] *Dostoyevsky's speech.* It was delivered in Moscow in 1880, on the occasion of the unveiling of Pushkin's statue in that city.

These are extremes, but characteristic extremes pointing to the trend of national thought. Russia is so huge and so strong, that material power has ceased to be attractive to her thinkers. Nevertheless, we need not yet retire into the desert or deliver ourselves to be bound hand and foot by 'civilised' Germans. Russia also wields a sword—a charmed sword, blunt in an unrighteous cause, but sharp enough in the defence of right and freedom. And this war is indeed our *Befreiungskrieg*. The Slavs must have their chance in the history of the world, and the date of their coming of age will mark a new departure in the growth of civilisation.

Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to His Majesty
at the Edinburgh University Press

PAN GERMANISM

BY

ROLAND G. USHER, Ph.D.

Originally published (*7s. 6d. net*), *April* 1913
Reprinted (*Cheap Edition*), *August* 1914
,, ,, *September 2nd*, 1914
,, ,, *September 3rd*, 1914
,, ,, *September 16th*, 1914

Paper, 2s. net. Cloth, 2s. 6d. net.

The Times of August 27th, 1914, in a joint review of this book and of Bernhardi's famous work, *Germany and the Next War*, says that—

'Professor Usher's book is a very valuable complement to General von Bernhardi's; for it brings us the evidence of an impartial witness that General von Berhardi's creed was not the creed of a mere military firebrand, but had become the creed almost of the whole German nation.

'Professor Usher is no prejudiced Englishman, but an American professor of history in an American University.

'. . . His book was published last year, and on the very first page he sums up, without the slightest hesitation or doubt, the conclusions to which his study of the situation brings him:—

'"**The Germans aim at nothing less than the domination of Europe and of the World by the Germanic Race.**"

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE

By H. W. C. DAVIS, M.A.

Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford ; sometime Fellow of All Souls' College.

Demy 8vo. 6s. net.

CONTENTS: Preface—Editions cited—Early Life (1834-1857)—*Die Freiheit* (1861)—Treitschke and Bismarck (1861-1866)—The Movement for German Unity (1848-1866)—The North German Confederation and the Founding of the German Empire (1866-1871)—The Franco-German War—*Die Politik*, (I.) The Nature of the State—*Die Politik*, (II.) The Relations of State with State—*Die Politik*, (III.) Constitutions—Treitschke on English History in the Nineteenth Century.

THE HAPSBURG MONARCHY

By WICKHAM STEED

First Published, October 1913. *Second Edition, June* 1914.
Third Edition, September 1914.

Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

'The Tragedy of the Hapsburgs must interest every one who thinks at all. We would recommend once again Mr. Wickham Steed's book *The Hapsburg Monarchy*. To get a true grasp of this war Mr. Steed's brilliant and subtle work is quite necessary.'—*Saturday Review*, September 19th, 1914.

'Probably the most perfect study of its subject that our language contains.'—*Observer*.

'A work which bears on every page the stamp of authority, and shows unusual powers of observation.'—*Athenæum*.

'The best study we have. . . . The standard work on the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.'—*English Review*.

'The lucid account which he gives . . . has perhaps not been surpassed in any other single work in English.'—*New Statesman*.

SIR THOMAS BARCLAY'S
NEW BOOK

LAW AND USAGE OF WAR

Being a practical Handbook of the Law and Practice of War and Prize for the use of students and laymen.

Small Crown 8vo. 6s. net.

Sir Thomas Barclay is Vice-President of the International Institute of Law.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THIRTY YEARS' ANGLO-FRENCH REMINISCENCES

With Frontispiece in Colour. Second Edition. Revised.

Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net.

'The Birth of the Entente.'—*Manchester Guardian.*

'The Father of the Entente.'—*The Nation.*

'The Making of the Entente.'—*The Observer.*

'The Genesis of the Entente.'—*The Globe.*

'A Great Peacemaker.'—*Truth.*

PROBLEMS OF POWER

By W. MORTON FULLERTON

Sometime Correspondent of *The Times*.

First Published, April 1913. *Second Impression, September* 1913.
Second Edition, Revised, September 1914.

7s. 6d. net.

'A fascinating study of Modern International Politics.'—*The Globe.*

'An important work.'—*The Athenæum.*

'This brilliant book.'—*The Daily Telegraph.*

'A really noteworthy study of International Politics.'—THEODORE ROOSEVELT in *The Outlook* (N.Y.).

'The brilliancy of Mr. Fullerton's new analysis of International Politics is undeniable; it is always interesting and always instructive. The pages in which he sketches the history of French politics since 1870 are admirable in their lucidity and firm grasp of essential tendencies.'—*Morning Post.*

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS. 1870-1900

By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.

Fourth Edition, with a New Preface, October 1914.

Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

Dr. Rose, the famous writer on Napoleon and other subjects in European history, brings into one volume the history of the Franco-Prussian War, of the formation of the Dual and Triple Alliances, of the development of Modern Russia, and of the entire Eastern and Balkan Question. Maps and Plans are plentifully given.

'A just and well-balanced account of the chief events from the year 1870 to the beginning of the present century. Necessarily difficult as his task has been, he has accomplished it meritoriously. We recommend this book.'—*Observer.*

'Dr. Rose has not only read widely but has formed his own opinions, which are well balanced. The volume is valuable as a storehouse of facts conscientiously ascertained.'—*Morning Post.*

'A solid, excellent, and most useful piece of work.'—*Manchester Guardian.*

3 4444 07165 9494

947 V78 DEC 3

BROOKLYN PUBLIC LIBRARY

This Book may be kept 14 days from the last date stamped below.

A fine of 2 CENTS will be charged for each day the Book is kept beyond that time.

4 Je'10
18 Ag'15
20 Ag'15
19 Fe'16
20 De'16
17 Ja'23
8 May'24
30 Oct'27
10 De'29
17 De'29
17 Mr'34



Form No. Ds. Nf. 12-14-80M. M. & C. Co.

Brooklyn Public Library

Montague Branch
197 Montague St
Tel. 2773 Main

Open 8.30 A. M. to 9 P. M
Sundays and Holidays
2 to 6 P. M.

Regulations

Any inhabitant of New York may take books from the Library. Books not in general demand may be loaned for 30 days. The time for which other books may be loaned may be limited, at the discretion of the Librarian, to 3, 7 or 14 days according to the demand. The length of time for which a book is issued is clearly indicated on the dating slip.

Any book, except those designated "three" or "seven-day books," current numbers of magazines and books which have been reserved for another borrower, may be renewed for the same length of time as that for which it was originally issued.

When renewing book by mail or telephone give title, number, and date charged.

Each book kept overtime is subject to a fine of two cents a day until its return; if retained two weeks overtime it will be sent for at the borrower's expense.

Books should be examined for mutilations, etc., at the time of borrowing, as the last borrower must be held responsible.

Form Rg. 12000-12-14-E

BROOKLYN PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 4444 07165 9494
T3-CBT-924